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When nationals of State A face an imminent threat of injury in State B and State B 
fails to provide security to them, will State A get a ‘right’ to intervene in the territory 
of State B under the pretext of protecting its nationals? Will it not violate the 
territorial integrity and political independence of State B? Does International Law 
allow States to use military force to protect their nationals abroad? What does the 
State Practice suggest? Protection of Nationals Abroad is a very delicate matter in 
international law and has been a subject of intense debate for a long time. This article 
tries to shed some light to the issues raised above with the help of three important 
incidents which history has witnessed which deal with protection of national abroad; 
first one being the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, second is 
that of Israel on Entebbe and the last being the American intervention in Grenada.  
 
                                                         ***** 
 
In 1976, Israeli troops landed in Entebbe, Uganda, without seeking the authorisation 
of the Ugandan Government.1In the middle of an armed conflict between Israel and 
Hizbollah in 2006, the Canadian Government commenced evacuation of 
approximately 14,000 citizens of Canada. In yet another occasion, Russian tanks, 
aircrafts and troops crossed the border into the Republic of Georgia in the Caucasus in 
2008.2  These incidents share a common characteristic; these were the military actions 
taken by the States to provide assistance to their citizens staying in a foreign State. In 
the present world, protection of nationals abroad is seen as a very complex issue 
involving various facets. Before the adoption of the United Nations Charter, States 
had an undisputed right to rescue their nationals and property by resorting to military 
force in territories of other States. Over time, especially during the Cold War, 
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powerful States used this as a pretext for hegemonic interventions, which were 
directed to pursue completely different objectives and these were met with significant 
opposition.3 
 
The “doctrine of protection of nationals abroad” deals with the legal justification for 
military assistance to the citizens of a State outside its border. This involves an 
intervention by one State, often represented by its armed forces into the territory of 
another State for the purpose of protection of lives of its own citizens. 4 British jurist 
Sir Humphrey Waldock pointed out three conditions which need to be fulfilled in 
order to the right of protection of nationals abroad to be valid, “(i) an imminent threat 
of injury to nationals must exist; (ii) there must be a failure or inability on the part of 
the territorial sovereign to protect the nationals and (iii) the measures of protection 
must strictly be confined to the object of protecting them against injury.”5 The act by 
a State of sending in armed forces in order to protect its nationals abroad however 
involved a very complex issue of infringing territorial integrity and political 
independence of another State.  
 
It is often noted that before 1945, interventions of this kind were permitted.6 After the 
adoption of the United Nations Charter, whenever the territorial State consents, rescue 
operations and evacuations can be lawfully carried out. However the problem arises 
where there is no consent from the territorial State. In such circumstances whether 
“protection of nationals” in foreign territory is compatible with the UN Charter or not 
is subjected to much debate. Its legality and legal basis both are strongly contested.7 
Some scholars argue that there is a right to protect nationals by the use of force under 
the customary international law but this is uncertain.8  
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Scholars who support the “doctrine of protection of nationals” invoke a variety of 
arguments in their favour, important being that these interventions do not infringe the 
prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, since it does not 
harm the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of the State. The idea is to 
merely protect the nationals from a danger, which the territorial State fails to do. The 
second important argument in their favour is that the intervention constitutes an act of 
self-defence. 9  Two arguments have been advanced under self-defence, that the 
inherent right of self-defence, which is enshrined in the UN Charter, has the 
customary right of self-defence in it, which among other things extends to the 
protection of nationals; and since nationals form a part of essential attributes of a 
State, an attack against nationals abroad is an attack against the State itself thereby 
triggering Article 51 of the UN Charter.10 
 
It is generally accepted that Article 2(4) is customary law and forms a part of jus 
cogens norms.11 The scope of prohibition under this Article has been subjected to 
intense debate. People who support the argument that the intervention does not 
infringe Article 2(4) adopt a literal interpretation of the Charter. They argue that when 
armed forces are used to protect nationals, it is not inconsistent with the Article 2(4), 
in those cases where it does not involve a separation of part of the State which is 
subjected to intervention or there is a prolonged presence of the troops of the 
intervening State in the territory of the State where intervention has taken place.12 
They further argue that Article 2(4) does not protect the inviolability of the State but 
only its territorial integrity and political independence. The prohibition on use of force 
under Article 2(4) is not absolute. It is also argued that the use of force for the 
protection of nationals when confined to the limits prescribed by the customary 
international law do not violate the purposes of the United Nations.13 Furthermore, 
Article 2(4) does not just prohibit use of force but also ‘threat’ of use of force.14 
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But developments in recent years reinforce the prohibition on the use of force. 
Intervention in other States has been prohibited by the Declaration Concerning 
Friendly Relations.15 The principle of non-intervention forms a part of customary 
international law, which is based on the concept of respect to territorial sovereignty of 
States16 and the International Court of Justice has accepted the same.17 Scholars who 
criticize justification under Article 2(4) argue on the basis of textual interpretation of 
the UN Charter, that with the passage of time the terms ‘territorial integrity’ and 
‘political independence’ merely stand for territorial inviolability. An intervention by 
use of armed forces in another State’s soil violates the first part of Article 2(4).18 
Intervention on another State’s territory to protect nationals relies largely on the 
argument of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Unlike Article 2(4), this 
provides viable justification for the intervention. Two important issues have to be 
noted here. Firstly, since Article 51 allows the right of self-defence only when there is 
an armed attack against one of the members of the United Nations, much is dependent 
on the fact whether or not an attack on nationals abroad is considered as attack on 
State itself.19 If this is answered positive, then it implies that an offence against a 
citizen is an offence against the State. Scholars have also argued a state of necessity 
as a reason for protection of nationals on the foreign soil by use of force, according to 
which “loss of life and certain kinds of grave physical injury are irremediable.”20 
Once its lost, its lost forever, it cannot be brought back. So the only way to safeguard 
is by prevention. 
Secondly, it is important to see whether or not the inherent right of self-defence 
includes the protection of nationals. The customary antecedent of self-defence was 
noted at the time of drafting of the UN Charter.21 The ICJ in the Nicaragua22 case 
noted that “Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 
"natural" or "inherent" right of self-defense, and it is hard to see how this can be 
other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and 
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influenced by the Charter. Moreover the Charter, having recognized the existence of 
this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content.”
23 The right of 
self-defence belongs to the States not by grant under the UN Charter but by it being a 
pre-existing right. Article 51 only declares the existing right and does not constitute a 
new one.24 
It is also argued that when a foreign State breaches its duty to safeguard the lives of 
people within its territory, the right of the State to protect its nationals get 
crystalized.25 However, not all infringements can trigger the use of force by other 
States. As per Waldock, it is important for there being an “immediate threat of 
irreparable injury to the life” of the nationals.26 According to customary international 
law, a State that acts in self-defence must do so within the boundaries of necessity and 
proportionality. 27  These principles have been derived from the famous Caroline 
Incident. A State must show “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”28 According to the principle of 
necessity, a State can use force only when it is left with no other non-forcible 
alternative and that use of force is a last resort and the principle of proportionality 
requires the level of use of force to be proportionate to the severity of the attack.29  
Scholars who are against the right of self-defence argument mainly argue that the 
language of Article 51 cannot be stretched too far to include the concept of an attack 
against nationals; the State practice which support this concept is very minimal and 
limited and if intervention by use of armed force is allowed, there are high chances of 
abusing this doctrine.30 
According to Bowett, the right to protect nationals abroad under limits set forth by 
international law is not inconsistent with Article 2(4). In case if one proves a 
convincing case that it is inconsistent with Article 2(4), it would still be permissible 
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under the right of self-defence, which is considered as an exception to Article 2(4).31 
Hence it can be said that Article 51 does not prohibit rather it is permissive. Article 
2(4) is the only Article, which is prohibitive in nature, which leaves the right of self-
defence unaffected.32 It is also argued that neither the U.N Charter nor the customary 
international law makes a separate exception for the use of force to protect nationals 
abroad. When a State unilaterally resorts to use of force to achieve this end, it does 
not constitute collective self-defence. Hence, only when the use of force for 
protection of nationals falls within the parameters of the right to self-defence, it can 
be considered lawful.33  
Following are some of the incidents, which have taken place where States have 
intervened by the use of armed force to rescue their nationals on foreign soil. 
I. United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 
There was a civil strife going on in the Dominican Republic, when United States 
marines task force landed in San Domingo on 28th April 1965. The President Bed 
Cabral was forced to resign by the ‘Constitutional Party’, which put one of its own 
men to the post. Cabral’s supporters formed the ‘National Reconstruction 
Government’ and were fighting to return to power. The rebels of the ‘National 
Reconstruction Government’ requested the American intervention. When the United 
States marines landed, the island of Dominic Republic was in a state of anarchy.34  
In the beginning, the United States of America justified the intervention by sending 
some 1700 troops, as a measure taken to protect its nationals and nationals of other 
countries. A statement was submitted to the Security Council according to which, “the 
American government was officially notified by the police and the military authority 
of Dominic Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the lives of 
the American citizens”35 only then United States sent its troops to give protection to 
hundreds of American nationals and escort them safely back to the United States. As 
the debate progressed, the United States added another justification that there was a 
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need ‘to give the Inter-American system (the OAS) a chance to deal with the 
situation.’36  The Organization of American States passed a resolution creating an 
inter-American force and the United States expanded its military presence in the 
island of Dominic Republic to around 22,000 troops, justifying it on the ground of 
OAS.37 
But soon it became clear that the reason was something else when United States 
declared that the intervention was aimed primarily at ‘preventing another Cuba’.38 
Ever since the 19th century, Central America and Caribbean have been of concern to 
the leaders of the United States. In 1959, when Fidel Castro emerged victorious in 
Cuba, it heightened the worries. At the same time, there were anti-American riots in 
the Panama Canal Zone.39 The United States feared that with growing unrest in the 
Dominican Republic and increasing spread of communist ideology, another country 
might end up joining the Soviet bloc.  
The United Kingdom and Netherlands thanked the United States for saving their 
nationals, while the French representative cautiously remarked that the United States 
had a right to intervene and protect its own citizens but these operations must be shot-
ranged in time, objective and scope.40 Heavy criticism came from the communist 
countries like the Soviet Union which asserted that the United States was using the 
protection of nationals as a pretext to intervene and restore a government which had 
been overthrown and hence violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Cuba 
tried to challenge the very argument of armed intervention for protection of nationals 
on foreign soil.  Several Latin American countries also reciprocated the same.41 When 
put for vote, the Soviet Union draft resolution, which condemned the United States, 
armed intervention as violation of United Nations Charter, was rejected.42 
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II. The Israeli Raid on Entebbe, 1976 
Terrorists hijacked an Air France airplane, which left Israel for France, on June 27th 
1976. The Palestinian hijackers first landed the aircraft in Libya and then at Entebbe, 
Uganda. The hijackers demanded the release of some terrorists jailed in Israel, West 
Germany and other States. A couple of days later, the terrorists freed all the non-
Israeli passengers but continued to hold the Israeli passengers as hostages. On 3rd 
July, the Israeli airborne commandos landed in Entebbe without the authorization of 
the Government of Uganda. The hostages were freed and were flown back to Israel 
after a brief but an intense exchange of fire. In the process some Ugandan soldiers 
were killed and some were wounded, some of the Ugandan aircrafts were also 
destroyed.43   
Soon after this, the UN Security Council called on a Meeting to discuss Israel’s 
actions in freeing their nationals by intervening in Ugandan territory. 44  Uganda 
claimed that Israel by its ‘act of aggression’ has violated its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. This was countered by Israel, which alleged that Ugandan government 
failed in its duty under international law of protecting and safeguarding the lives of 
foreign nationals and was a complicit with the terrorists and therefore its intervention 
was a legitimate act of self-defence.45 Israel also argued that it had confined itself to 
the necessity and proportionality principles as articulated in the Caroline case and that 
the intervention was not directed against Republic of Uganda and only that amount of 
armed forces were employed as much as it was necessary to rescue its own 
nationals.46 This was followed by introduction of two draft resolutions, one by Benin, 
Libya and Tanzania and the other by the USA and the UK. “The first one condemning 
Israel’s blatant violation of Uganda’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, coupled 
with a demand that Israel must meet the just claims of Uganda and grant 
compensation for the destruction inflicted. The second one condemning the hijack and 
such other acts which threaten the lives of passengers and crews and safety of 
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international civil aviation and a call to all States to take up necessary actions to 
prevent the occurrence of such incidents and punish the terrorists.”47 The first one was 
withdrawn before putting it to vote gathering that it would not get strong support and 
the second did not pass through the vote.48 
The United States of America was of the opinion that Israel’s actions constituted ‘a 
temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda’. It noted that “even though the 
UN Charter does not allow such violations, in those cases where there is an imminent 
threat of injury or death of the nationals in the territory of that State which is either 
unwilling or unable to protect, then the right to use limited force to protect the 
nationals flows from the right of self-defense.”49 Due to these factors coupled with the 
use of force proportionate to the goal, the US found that Israel’s actions were justified 
and lawful. The UK’s position was ambiguous. It only sought a clarification on “how, 
the duty that the State had of protecting its nationals could be reconciled with respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State.”50 France was of the opinion 
that even though Israel had violated international law, such an infringement of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda was not intended. The goal was only to 
save its nationals.51 Japan on the other hand, held that Israel’s actions amounted to 
prima facie violation of Ugandan territorial sovereignty and political independence.52  
States like Uganda, Kenya, Libya, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union 
and many others demanded a condemnation of Israel’s actions. Most of them argued 
that Israel’s actions constituted ‘aggression’ and hence a blatant violation of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. The argument of self-defence under Article 51 was countered 
by saying that the pre-requisite for the application of Article 51 is there being an 
‘armed attack’, and in this case Israel was not subjected to any armed attack.53At the 
end of the debate, as mentioned above, no resolution was adopted as there was no 
consensus among the States. 
 
                                               
47 Francis A. Boyle, The Entebbe Hostage Crisis (1982) 29 (1) Netherlands International Law Review 
49. 
48 Supra note 45 at 58. 
49 Supra note 1 at 38. 
50 ibid 38. 
51 ibid 38. 
52 ibid 39. 
53 ibid 39, 40. 
 10 
III. American Intervention in Grenada, 1983 
In 1979, there was a communist coup led by Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel 
movement, which overthrew the government in Grenada. Bishop was named the 
Prime Minster of Grenada and he became very popular among the general public. 
This had attracted the attention of the United States of America. Bishop’s inclination 
towards left-wing policies and his friendship with Fidel Castro of Cuba created 
serious concerns on the American government and it subjected Grenada to economic 
and diplomatic pressures.54 On 19th October 1983, there was a second coup, which 
was more violent and left Maurice Bishop and many others dead. A twenty-four hour 
curfew was announced and was warned that the violators would be shot on sight.55 
The United States President Reagan described the “shoot-to-kill” curfew as “barbaric” 
and realized that the time has arrived to intervene. On 20th October he ordered a group 
of marines, which were supposed to go to Lebanon to be diverted to eastern 
Caribbean.56  
Meanwhile, Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of Grenada secretly asked the 
assistance of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to restore peace 
and order in the region. The OECS in turn requested the United States of America for 
help on October 22.57 This was followed by diplomatic and military consultations by 
the President of the United States who then issued order to proceed with the landing 
on 24th October. The American Government justified its intervention on the grounds 
that “(a) on the appeal of Sir Scoon, the United States went on to assist to restore 
order in Grenada; (b) OECS came to a conclusion that there was a threat to peace in 
the region due to unrest in Grenada and under their collective defense treaty, action 
was to be taken and United States assistance was requested and (c) there were around 
1,000 American nationals (mainly medical students) in Grenada whose security was 
thought to be in a jeopardy and that required immediate action.”58 The use of force by 
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the United States was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly. The 
United States in the Security Council however vetoed the resolution that condemned 
the intervention.59  
It must be noted that Grenada was becoming highly influenced by the Communist 
ideology due to Bishop’s personal friendship with Castro. Another State in the 
Caribbean becoming a member of the Communist bloc was unacceptable to the 
United States and this was the driving force behind the intervention. The local unrest 
in Grenada provided a motive as well as an opportunity for the United States to 
intervene.60 It is also argued that there was no threat to the lives of the American 
nationals during the entire time.61 Even after the invasion, there have been no reports 
of any American resident of Grenada being harmed, inspite of the popular feeling 
against the United States. 62  Apart from this, the American intervention was 
questioned particularly since Grenada continued to be occupied for months, long after 
the evacuation of the American citizens had been wound up. According to the 
principle of proportionality, invasion of this kind needs to be terminated as soon as 
possible, with minimal encroachment on the sovereignty of the foreign State.63 
Conclusion: 
The paper has examined various facets of the use of force by one State to protect its 
nationals in another State. According to customary international law, a State acting in 
self-defence must do so within the parameters of necessity and proportionality. On the 
other hand, it can be seen that even though an argument under Article 51 of the 
Charter of United Nations seems to be extremely convincing to use force to protect 
nationals abroad, certain key questions like there being an ‘armed attack’ against one 
of the member States of the United Nations to trigger Article 51 and ‘whether an 
attack on nationals is an attack on the State itself’ remain unanswered. 
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The paper examined three interventions from the past, which deal with three different 
yet significant issues. In the American intervention of Dominican Republic, the 
United States of America did not invoke the argument of self-defence. But instead, it 
said that the island was in a state of anarchy. One of the rebel factions informed the 
American government that the foreign residents were in danger and that it was 
impossible to maintain peace and order. It was only due to this, the United States went 
ahead with the intervention.64 On the other hand, the so-called government, which 
was representing the island, was one of the factions that contributed to the civil strife. 
The Security Council allowed the representative of the ‘Constitution Party’ to take 
part in the debate as an individual and not a representative of the government. He 
stated that no foreign national was in mortal danger. In this case more than the 
validity in principle of right to protect nationals abroad, the lawfulness of having 
recourse to it was being contested.65 It has also been noted that the United States had 
other political interests with regard to the island of Dominic Republic as it did not 
want ‘another communist State’ in the western hemisphere. Hence the American 
intervention was met with heavy criticism especially from the Communist bloc and 
Latin American countries, that the protection of nationals was a mere pretext to 
achieve the political aim, with Cuba stating categorically that the intervention, even 
on principle was forbidden by the United Nations Charter.66  
 
In the Israeli intervention of Entebbe, powerful arguments were advanced on both the 
sides. Israel argued that its action had been brought about by the ‘necessity of self-
defence’, as under the Caroline case, that its actions were both necessary and 
proportionate and there was no other option but to resort to use of armed force to 
protect its citizens.67 On the other hand, States condemning the intervention claimed 
that “(a) Israel was not under any ‘armed attack’; (b) the hijackings and kidnappings 
by the terrorists had to be tackled through negotiations rather than using armed forces; 
(c) the raid irresponsibly risked the lives of innocent passengers and (d) the 
‘protection of nationals’ is a mere excuse of powerful States in engaging in fulfilling 
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their political ends.”68 This intervention saw many States declaring themselves, on 
principle, against protection of nationals abroad by using armed force.  
In the American intervention of Grenada, facts emerged clear that the American 
nationals’ lives were not at risk. Just as in the case of Dominican Republic, another 
country joining the Soviet bloc was something, which the United States did not want 
and that was the main driving force behind the intervention. This intervention is a 
classic case where the necessity and proportionality principles were violated, as the 
United States troops continued to occupy Grenada months after its nationals were 
rescued. 
Among the three, Israel’s intervention is seen as something, which complied with 
Wadlock’s three conditions and the principles of necessity and proportionality. Yet, it 
is not free from criticism as mentioned above. The other two are generally seen as 
mere pretexts to achieve a political aim.  
 
By a look into the present law in force, it can be concluded that there is no ‘right’ to 
protect nationals abroad using armed forces, neither are there sufficient State practices 
to show the same. At the same time, where States intervene in the territory of foreign 
States, it cannot be purely considered as an infringement of the United Nations 
Charter. There are certain genuine cases where States have to intervene and there is a 
need to create an exception for the same. These actions must be seen as a move 
towards an enlargement of number of exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force, 
due to the growing new needs of the international community and due to the partial 
implementation of the system, which the United Nations Charter foresaw. 69  The 
apprehension, especially among the third world countries, in accepting the principle 
of protection of nationals abroad can be understood, as there have been instances in 
the past, where it had been abused by powerful States to achieve their political ends 
and the less powerful States can do nothing but be mute spectators. Hence, if an 
exception in specific terms is carved out to include the use of force for protection of 
nationals abroad, its boundaries have to be clearly specified, leaving no scope for 
abuse. Once there is sufficient number of States consenting for the same, birth of new 
rule of international law can be seen. 
                                                                  **** 
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